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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the market structure and competitiveness of the banking industry in Jordan and the GCC countries 
during the period 2003-2010, using a method proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). Using a static and dynamic panel 
data framework for a sample of 90 commercial banks, the empirical results revealed that banks in Jordan and the GCC 
countries have generated their revenue under monopolistic competition. This finding indicates that banks in Jordan are 
able to compete with the banking sector in the GCC  countries. Therefore, the Jordanian government should seriously 
consider joining the GCC  group of countries in the future.
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ABSTRAK
Kertas ini memeriksa struktur pasaran dan persaingan dalam industri perbankan di negara Jordan dan negara GCC 
dalam tempoh 2003-2010 dengan menggunakan kaedah yang dicadangkan oleh Panzar dan Rosse (1987). Rangka 
kerja data panel statik dan dinamik telah digunakan untuk sampel 90 buah bank perdagangan, dan keputusan empirikal 
menunjukkan bank di Jordan dan negara GCC  menjana pendapatan mereka di bawah syarat persaingan bermonopoli. 
Keputusan kajian ini juga menjelaskan bank di Jordan mempunyai kemampuan untuk bersaing dengan bank-bank di 
rantau GCC . Maka, kerajaan Jordan seharusnya membuat pertimbangan yang serius untuk menyertai kumpulan GCC 
tersebut pada masa hadapan.
Kata kunci: Syarat persaingan; model Panzar dan Rosse; Dinamik GMM; Sektor perbankan di Jordan dan GCC 
INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary changes in the financial sector in the 
Middle Eastern countries, particularly in Jordan and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is reflected in the 
rapid financial deregulation, technological advances and 
financial innovation. These changes also have an impact 
on the role of banks and intermediaries with respect to 
pooling of financial resources; i.e. from surplus units 
and channeling the funds to deficit units for investment 
purposes, which would promote greater economic growth. 
The financial deregulation and rapid advancement in 
information and telecommunication technology increased 
the competition among banks, leading to financial 
innovation in the financial intermediaries, including 
banks. This financial development has provided new 
investment opportunities to households and firms in 
generating a higher revenue and better risk management. 
Therefore, financial products took the place of financial 
intermediaries in the systematic approach towards 
seeking the best financial solutions to specific problems 
of their clients, taking into account the current state of 
technology, finance and organizational theory (Merton 
and Bodie 1995).
In this dynamic new banking environment, the level 
of competition in the banking sector of Jordan and the 
GCC depend on the overall operational efficiency of 
the banks, as well as the ability to conduct financial 
innovation as they respond to new technological 
changes. Hence, banks’ competition measures are good 
indicators to gauge on how these competitive banks 
have become as the industry continues to develop. 
Banks that are relatively non-productive would be less 
efficient and therefore would lose market share and be 
replaced by the more productive ones. This is consistent 
with the functional financial intermediation view that 
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institutional structures are always changing towards 
those that are more efficient in performing the financial 
intermediation roles (Batchelor 2005).
Hart (1983) stated that the pressure of competition 
is usually the most effective instrument in promoting 
productive efficiency and encouraging management to 
operate close to their production frontier. Hauner and 
Peiris (2005) argued that the higher degree of competition 
within the banking system leads to higher efficiency; 
where this contributes to greater financial stability, 
product improvement, and better access by households 
and corporations to financial services. This could 
improve the economic growth prospects of a country. 
In this regard, there is concern that countries which are 
monopolistic are inefficient, and the fragile banking 
systems in several low-income countries could become 
a major hindrance to economic development. Therefore, 
it is essential to embrace the changes and environment 
that encourage competition and efficiency within the 
banking systems.
The revolutionary changes in the financial industry, 
particularly in the development of internet banking has 
definitely changed the nature of market structure and 
the extent of competition level among banks [see for 
example, Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Claessens 
et al. (2001), Bikker et al. (2009), Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000) and Berger et al. (1999)]. There are 
two reasons why the study of banking competition is 
interesting in the case of Jordan and the GCC countries. 
First, the banking system in Jordan had experienced 
an extensive evolution in its market structure and the 
regulatory environment since the late 1990s.1 Second, 
Jordan is in the process of becoming a member of the 
GCC, which of a co-operation status, comprising six 
countries namely; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE. In fact, the GCC intends to form a 
union in the near future. One of the criteria of forming 
a union is that member countries ought to have similar 
level of competition, particularly, in the banking sector. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate the level of 
competition and market structure of the banks in Jordan in 
evaluating their ability to compete and survive in the GCC 
union. This study focuses on the sample period after the 
structural changes and the adoption of latest technology 
in the late 1990s in the banking sector in Jordan and the 
GCC countries.
The focal point of this paper is to examine the level 
of competition in the Jordanian banking sector relative 
to the GCC, by adopting the Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
methodology. The paper contributes to the existing 
literature by improving and extending the earlier studies 
in three dimensions. First, this study revisits the level 
of banking competition and market structure in Jordan 
relative to the GCC banking sector during the era of 
internet banking. For this purpose, the Panzar and Rosse 
model is used, in which enables the calculation of a 
measure of market structure. Second, this study uses 
a larger sample of banks in the current period, as it is 
the first study to compare banks operating in Jordan 
relative to those in the GCC. Third, this study uses both 
the panel data techniques, namely static panel and 
dynamic panel. 
The results of this study revealed that the estimated 
H statistics for the sample period are positive and the 
Wald test for either monopoly or perfect competition 
market structure is rejected. Thus, the finding indicates 
that the banks in Jordan and GCC countries generated their 
revenue under monopolistic competition. Therefore, the 
banking sectors in Jordan have the ability to compete 
with banks in the GCC countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The 
subsequent section discusses earlier studies relating to 
measuring the competition levels in various countries. 
The third section deals with the theoretical aspect of 
bank-competition. The fourth section explains the 
estimation procedures by using the dynamic panel data in 
GMM framework. The fifth section reports the empirical 
findings followed by summary and conclusion in the 
last section. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section reviews the most relevant studies on 
banking competition using Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
model, based on cross country, and individual 
economies of developed and developing countries.
The theoretical concept of contestable market 
developed by Baumol (1982) shows that oli gopolies 
and monopolies do sometimes behave like perfectly 
competitive firms. The theory of contestable markets for 
the banking industry has attracted many researchers in 
examining the degree of market structure of the banking 
industry. For example, the most notable studies among 
many others, are by Shaffer (1982, 1985, 1993), Nathan 
and Neave (1989), Molyneux and Forbes (1995) and 
Molyneux et al. (1996). These previous studies employed 
the Rosse and Panzar (1977) model in examining the 
competitive conditions of the banking sector in the U.S, 
Canada, Japan and Europe. Nathan and Neave (1989) 
found some evidence that the U.S and Canadian banking 
markets are operating under monopolistic competition.
The first application of the Panzar and Rosse test on 
banking data was by Shaffer (1982), where his results 
revealed monopolistic competition for a sample of banks 
operating in New York. Similar results were shown 
by Molyneux and Forbes (1995) for European banks 
in France, Germany, Spain and the UK for the period 
1986-1989, while the Italian banking sector indicated 
a monopoly market. De Bandt and Davis (2000) found 
monopolistic competition markets for France, Germany, 
Italy and the US during the period 1992-1996. The study 
by Nathan and Neave (1989) for Canada, Molyneux et al. 
(1996) for Japan, Staikouras and Koutsomanoli‐Fillipaki 
(2006) for a large number of European Union members 
reported similar results, that is the banks are operating 
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under monopolistic competition. On the other hand, 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) have examined the competitive 
conditions for banks in 23 industrial countries using 
the Panzar and Rosse model; and they concluded that 
the banking sectors under study were characterized by 
monopolistic competition.
Many studies used the popular model of Panzar 
and Rosse, with adaptations recommended by Bikker et 
al. (2006) and Goddard and Wilson (2009). Panzar and 
Rosse (1987; 1982) and Nathan and Neave (1989) and 
Perrakis (1991). Their studies assumed that firms enter 
or leave the market quickly, without losing their capital, 
and that their possible competitors operate on the same 
cost functions as established firms. One of the restrictions 
of the Panzar and Rosse tests is that it gives ambiguous 
results when the banks in question are not completely 
adjusted to the market conditions. However, the test 
usually shows that the market is competitive and that 
the monopoly power has not been exercised. Secondly, 
it cannot differentiate between competitive pric ing and 
simple costing plus pricing. 
Few studies that examined the competition level for 
the banking sector in developing countries had used the 
Panzar and Rosse model, for example Al-Muharrami et 
al. (2006) and Turk Ariss (2010). The only study on GCC 
countries is by Al-Muharrami et al. (2006). This study 
investigated the market structure of the GCC banking 
sector for the period 1993-2002 and evaluated the 
monopoly power of banks. Their investigation suggested 
that there are advantages in examining the banks of the 
GCC countries as an aggregate. Overall the GCC banking 
system could be viewed as operating under the condition 
of monopolistic competition. The results showed that 
all countries are in equilibrium and that Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE have un-concentrated markets and are 
moving towards less concentrated positions. Additionally, 
the Panzar and Rosse results suggested a mixed bag of 
competitive, monopolistic competition and monopoly 
within the GCC economies. The study of Turk Ariss 
(2010) for the Middle Eastern countries showed that, 
except for countries in North Africa where monopolistic 
conditions are found, the prevailing market structure in 
Middle East and North African (MENA) banking sector 
is mostly monopolistic competition. The results indicate 
that Islamic banking is less competitive compared to 
conventional banking. 
Several studies analyzed competition in banking 
sector over time using Panzar and Rosse (1987) model, 
assuming that competition gradually changes over time 
or by providing yearly estimates of competition. Some 
of these studies focused on cross country comparison in 
developed countries. Cross country studies were carried 
out by Goddard and Wilson (2009) for G7 countries, 
and Berger et al. (2009) for 8,235 banks in 23 developed 
countries, De Bandt and Davis (2000) for France, 
Germany, Italy and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) for 
11 Latin American countries. The results of Goddard and 
Wilson (2009) indicated that banks in these countries are 
operating under monopolistic competition, while Berger 
et al. (2009) suggested that consistent with the traditional 
“competition-fragility” view, banks with a higher degree 
of market power also have less overall risk exposure. 
The result also provided some support for one element 
of the “competition-stability” view, whereby market 
power increases loan portfolio risk. They showed that 
this risk could be offset in part by higher equity capital 
ratios. The study by De Bandt and Davis (2000) for 
France, Germany, Italy and the US for the period 1992-
1996 showed that within the European Union, Germany 
and France monopolistic competition describes the large 
banks, while monopoly for the small ones. Meanwhile, 
in Italy there is evidence of monopolistic competition for 
small and large banks. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 
examined the competitive conditions of the banking 
industries in eleven Latin American countries for the 
period 1993–2000. They concluded that banks in these 
countries appeared to generate revenues and operate 
under monopolistic competition.
Other researchers focused on individual countries 
in the developed and less-developed economies. For 
example, Daley and Matthews (2012) studied the 
Jamaican banking market for the period 1998 to 2009 and 
Mkrtchyan (2005) used the sample of American banks. 
They found monopolistic competition in the market as a 
whole. Matthews et al. (2007) examined the major British 
banks, during the period of major structural change. Rosse 
and Panzar estimated the H-statistic for a panel of 12 
banks for the period 1980-2004. The results confirmed 
the consensus finding that competition in British banking 
is most accurately characterized by the theoretical model 
of monopolistic competition.
Given the above discussion, this study would 
contribute towards filling the gap by providing new 
empirical evidence for the market structure and 
competition level in Jordan and in the GCC countries. This 
is because there is no earlier study on banking competition 
and market structure of the Jordanian banking sector 
relative to the GCC countries. This paper could be 
construed as the first of such study. Therefore, the focal 
point of this study is to comprehensively investigate the 
degree of market structure and competition condition of 
the banking industry in Jordan relative to the entire six 
GCC countries, based on the large number of conventional 
and Islamic banks.
THEORETICAL MODEL
Rosse and Panzar (1982, 1987, 1977) developed a 
simple model of market competition in examining 
the market structure. There are two assumptions of 
the model. First, firms enter or leave rapidly, without 
losing the potential competitors or lose of their capital. 
Second, the cost functions are identical for potential 
competitor and incumbent companies on the market. 
The central argument is that, although the market is 
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contestable, the threat of market entry with price-cutting 
by potential competitors enforces marginal cost pricing 
by incumbents, so that in equilibrium they would not earn 
excess profits and no entry is observed to occur. 
However, Shaffer (2004) noted that the Panzar and 
Rosse model is preferred as it is robust even in small 
empirical samples and works well with firm-specific 
data on revenues and factor prices without requiring 
information on equilibrium output prices and quantities 
for the sector . Therefore, this study employs the “Non-
Structural Model” approach suggested by Rosse and 
Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987), the so 
called H-statistic to study the market structure of Jordan 
relative to the GCC banking sector. This method has been 
widely used in the examination of competitive structure 
of banking industry in various countries. 
The test is derived from a general banking market 
model, which determines equilibrium output and the 
equilibrium number of banks, by maximizing profits at 
both the banking level and the sector level. This implies 
firstly, that bank maximizes its profits, where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost:
 R’it(yit, nt, kit) – C’it(yit, pit, qit) = 0 (1)
Rit indicates revenues and Cit to costs of bank i (the 
prime denoting marginal), yit is the output of bank i , n is 
the number of banks, pit is a vector of m factor input prices 
of bank i, kit is a vector of exogenous variables that shift 
the bank’s revenue function, qi is a vector of exogenous 
variables that shift the bank’s cost function. Secondly, at 
the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero 
profit restriction holds:
 R*i(y*, n*, k*) – C*it(y*, p, q) = 0 (2)
Variables marked with an asterisk (*) refer to 
equilibrium values. Market power is considered by the 
extent to which a change in factor input prices (dpmi) is 
reflected in the equilibrium revenues (dR*i) earned by 
bank i. Panzar and Rosse define a measure of competition 
H as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form 
revenues with respect to factor prices:
 H = ∑
m
k=1
 
∂R*i––––
∂wki
 
wki–––
R*i
 (3)
Where Ri indicates revenues of bank i (* refers to 
equilibrium values) and wt is a vector of m factor input 
prices of bank i. Market power is considered by the extent 
to which a change in factor input prices ∂wki reflects the 
equilibrium revenues ∂R*I earned by bank i.
The H-statistic measures the sum of the elasticities of 
banks’ total revenue with respect to input prices. Hence, 
it is calculated as the sum of the input prices coefficients 
β1, β2 and β3 as shown in equation (4):
 H =∑
J
j=1
βj (4)
Where j=1,…J, and J is the number of inputs 
included in the calculations. The Panzar-Rosse’s H 
statistic is interpreted as follows: H is equal to zero or 
negative when the competitive structure is monopoly or 
perfectly colluding oligopoly. When H equals 1, it refers 
to perfect competition and 0<H<1 refers to monopolistic 
competition. H could be interpreted as a continuous 
measure of the level of competition, in particular between 
0 and 1, in the sense that higher values of H indicate 
stronger competition than lower values [Bikker and Haaf 
(2002); Goddard et al. (2001) and Casu and Girardone 
(2006)]. 
The empirical application of the Panzar and Rosse 
approach assumes a log-linear marginal cost function 
(dropping subscripts referring to bank i).
 ln Mc = β0 + β1 ln y + ∑
m
i=1
 δipi + ∑
g
j=1
 γj ln qj (5)
Where y is output of the bank, pi is the factor input 
price and q is other variable, exogenous to the cost 
function as in equation (4). Equally, the underlying 
marginal revenue function has been assumed to be log-
linear of the form.
 ln MR = α0 + α1 ln y + ∑
h
i=1
 φi ln ki (6)
Where ki is variable associated to the bank-specific 
demand function. For a profit-maximizing bank, 
marginal costs equal marginal revenues in equilibrium, 
yielding the equilibrium value for output (denoted by 
an asterisk):
ln y* = [(β0 + α0 + ∑mi=1 δi ln pi + ∑
g
j=1
γj ln qj – ∑
h
i=1
φi ln ki)/ 
 (α1 + β1)]  (7)
The reduced-form equation for revenues of bank 
i is the product of the equilibrium values of output of 
bank i and the common price level, determined by the 
inverse-demand equation, in logarithms, of the form 
ln P = ωˇ + η ln ∑i y*i.
RESEARCH METHOD
DATA
The data set was obtained from the Bankscope 
database of Bureau van Dijk’s company which employs 
an unbalanced annual bank level data of the banks 
operating in Jordan and in the GCC countries (namely, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). 
It was drawn from 15 major banks of Jordan’s banking 
sector and 75 major banks of the GCC countries, including 
conventional and Islamic banks, encompassing a time 
span from 2003-2010. Three input factors, namely 
deposits, labor, and physical capital are considered in 
estimating the baseline model in equation (7). This study 
also included some of bank-specific factors to account 
for size, risk, and capacity differences. The factors are 
total assets to account for possible scale economies, 
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equity which is the ratio of total equity to total assets, net 
loans, and capacity indicator such as total fixed assets. 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
This study employed two types of panel data techniques, 
namely static and dynamic model. For the static panel 
model, this study used the fixed effects model. Fixed 
effect is controlling for unobserved heterogeneity when 
heterogeneity is constant over time and correlated 
with independent variables. On the other hand, for the 
dynamic panel, this study applied the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) as proposed by the Arellano and 
Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). This technique has an advantage in 
addressing the Nickell (1981) bias associated with the 
fixed effects in short panel, bias due to the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable and bias due to the endogeneity 
of other explanatory variables.
The Panzar and Rosse’s H statistic is equal to the sum 
of the related elasticities: H = PF + PL + PK. Panzar and 
Rosse showed that the H-statistic is calculated from the 
reduced form revenue equation and measures the sum of 
elasticities of total revenue of the banks with respect to 
the banks’ input prices, which could be used to recognize 
the structure of the market in which the firm operates. The 
value of H = 1 indicates perfect competition, in which 
an increase in cost causes some firms to exit, price to 
increase, and the revenue of survivors to increase where 
at the same time cost will increase (Goddard et al., 
2001). H value will be negative for collusive oligopoly or 
monopoly in which an increase in costs causes output to 
fall and price to increase. An upward shift in the marginal 
cost curve is associated with a reduction of revenue as 
a result of the optimality condition for the monopolist. 
0 < H < 1 indicates monopolistic competition, in which 
an increase in costs causes revenues to increase at a lower 
rate than that of costs.
The point of challenge is that Panzar and Rosse 
model is static and presumes market equilibrium or 
instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium at each time 
point when the data are observed. Goddard and Wilson 
(2009) noted that the presumption is not in line with 
reality as adjustment towards equilibrium is often not 
instantaneous and markets are therefore not necessarily 
in equilibrium; and therefore they recommend dynamic 
estimation model. Moreover, equilibrium within the 
banking sector does not mean that competitive condition 
is not allowed to change during the sample period, it 
only implies that changes in banking are gradual [Al-
Muharrami et al. (2006)].
The test for long-run equilibrium is performed with 
the following equation:
 ln(1 + ROAit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) 
  + h3 ln(PKit) + ln(ASSETSit) 
  + ln(EQUITYit) + ln(LOANit) 
  + ln(FIXEDit) + ui + λt + εi,t  (8) 
Following to Claessans and Laeven (2004) and 
Casu and Giradone (2006), the measure of ROA is 
actually calculated as ln(1+ROA) to adjust for (small) or 
negative values of ROA; where ROA is the pre-tax return 
on assets (pre-tax profits to total assets), because return 
on assets could take on (small) negative values. This 
could define the equilibrium E-statistic as h1 + h2 + h3 in 
testing whether E = 0, by using the F-test. If rejected, the 
market is assumed not to be in equilibrium. The scheme 
behind this test is that, in equilibrium, returns on bank 
assets should not be linked to input prices. This approach 
of testing on whether the observations are in long-run 
equilibrium has previously been used in the literature by 
Shaffer (1982) and Molyneux et al. (1996).
Based on earlier studies by Shaffer (1982, 1985), 
Molyneux et al. (1994), Nathan and Neave (1989) and 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), this study estimated the bank 
revenue function in static model in equation (9) in which 
revenue is explained by factor prices and other bank-
specific variables. A fixed effects panel data model is 
used to estimate reduced form revenue equation. In order 
to derive the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic method, the 
following baseline model has been estimated:
 ln(REVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) 
  + h3 ln(PKit) + ln(ASSETSit) 
  + ln(EQUITYit) + ln(LOANit) 
  + ln(FIXEDit) + ui + λt + εi,t  (9) 
For t = 1. . . T , where T is the number of periods 
observed, and i = 1. . . n, where n is the total number of 
banks and ln is the natural logarithm. The dependent 
variable (REV) is the ratio of total revenue to total assets 
and thus accounts for both the banks interest and non-
interest income. The variable is divided by total assets 
in order to account for size differences. Usually with 
intermediation approach, it is assumed that banks use 
three inputs factors, namely, deposits, labor, and physical 
capital. Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of these 
three inputs or reasonable proxies. Specifically, PF is the 
ratio of interest expenses to deposits and other liabilities, 
PL is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, and 
PK is the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed 
assets. To control for the yearly macro effects, under the 
PR framework, the H-statistic is equal to the sum of the 
elasticities of the revenue with respect to the three input 
prices: H = h1 + h2 + h3. The testable hypothesis for 
monopolistic competition is 0 < H < 1, while H ≤ 0 is 
monopoly. All variables are in logarithmic form.
Finally εit  is a two-component error term for the 
i-th firm that could be written as follows: εi,t = μit + vit, 
where vit  is a two-sided error term capturing the effects 
of statistical noise, assumed to be independent, identical 
and normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
σ2v. εit is also assumed to be independent with μit = 
{μi exp[–n(t – T)]}, where μi is a one-sided error term to 
capture the effects of inefficiency and could be assumed 
half normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u; 
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and n is an unknown parameter to be estimated capturing 
the effect of inefficiency change over time.
DYNAMIC PANEL GMM
The employment of static estimator, such as fixed effect 
or random effect, might lead to bias in the estimates 
[Goddard and Wilson, (2009)]. These studies further used 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to complete 
the following equation: 
 ln(REVit) = α0 + α1 ln(REVit – 1) + h1 ln(PFit)  
  + h2 ln(PLit) + h3 ln(PKit)  
  + α2 ln(ASSETSit) + α3 ln(EQUITYit) 
  + α4 ln(LOANit) + α5 ln(FIXEDit) 
  + ηi + λt + εi,t   (10) 
To remove the firm specific effect (ηi) in Equation 
(10), Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed a forward 
orthogonal deviation transformation or forward 
Helmert’s system. This transformation fundamentally 
subtracts the mean of future observations available in 
the sample from the first T–1 observation. The advantage 
is to maintain sample size in panels with gaps. On the 
other hand, a first-difference transformation has some 
weaknesses, in which, if some explanatory variables 
(REVit) are missing, then REVit and REVit + 1 are also 
missing in the transformed data [Roodman (2009)]. 
However, under orthogonal deviations, the transformed 
REVit + 1 need not go missing. 
The form of a linear dynamic panel regression in 
equation (10), where one or more lags of the dependant 
variables are included as covariant and unobserved 
individual, contains fixed or random effect. By assembly, 
the individual effects are correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. Interpretation of the standard fixed or 
random effects estimators are inconsistent. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) adopted a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator for such model, where this model is 
known as the difference GMM. The lagged exogenous 
variables values constitute genuine instruments for the 
first-differenced, lagged dependent variable. However 
these lagged variables might provide little information 
about the first differences [Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998)].
The consistency of the system GMM estimator 
depends on both the assumptions that the error term is not 
auto-correlated and also on the strength of the instruments 
used. The two specification tests are explained as follows. 
The first examines the validity of the instruments by 
analyzing the sample analogue of the moment conditions 
used in the estimation procedure based on Hansen test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines 
the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the error term. 
The occurrence of first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals does not mean that the estimates 
are not consistent. However, the occurrence of second-
order autocorrelation implies that the estimates are not 
consistent. The addition of the lagged dependent variables 
in the baseline banks’ revenue function in equation (10) 
implies that there is correlation between the regressors 
and the error term, ln(REVit) – (REVit–1) depends on εi,t–1, 
which is a function of the bank-specific effect (ηi). 
Given the correlation, the dynamic panel data 
estimation in equation (10) suffers from Nickell (1981) 
bias, which disappears only if T is large or approaches 
infinity. Thus, Arellano and Bond (1991) Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed 
GMM estimators to deal with the endogeneity problem 
(the correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term).
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995) recommended that the lagged levels or 
untransformed regressors be used as an instrument for 
the transformed variable. This relates to the difference 
GMM. However, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) proved that if the lagged 
dependent and the explanatory variables are determined 
over time or nearly a random walk, then lagged levels of 
these variables are weak instruments for the regression 
equation in differences. This takes place either as the 
autoregressive parameter (α) approaches unity, or as the 
variance of the individual effects (ηi) increases relative 
to the variance of the transient shocks (εit). Hence, to 
decrease the prospective bias and imprecision related 
to the difference estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
proposed system GMM approach by combining regression 
in differences and regression in levels. In addition to 
the regression in differences, the instruments for the 
regression in levels are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding instruments.
However, system GMM could generate moment 
conditions prolifically as noted by Roodman (2009). 
Adding too many instruments in the system GMM will 
overfit the endogenous variable. This could weaken the 
Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. Thus, this 
study used two main techniques to avoid instruments 
proliferation and limit the number of instruments, such 
as by using only certain lags instead of all available lags 
for instruments and combining instruments through 
addition into smaller sets by collapsing the block of the 
instrument matrix. This technique was used by earlier 
researchers, including Calderon et al. (2002), Beck and 
Levine (2004), Cardovic and Levine (2005), Roodman 
(2009), Azman-Saini et al. (2010), Karim et al. (2011), 
Karim (2012) and Karim and Azman-Saini (2013). 
This study used difference GMM estimation (one step 
and two-step). For robustness checking, the estimated 
system GMM (one step and two-step) is used. The benefit 
of using GMM estimator in producing unbiased, consistent, 
and efficient results is highly dependent on the adoption 
of the suitable instruments. There are three specification 
tests as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991); Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). First, 
the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions, which 
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tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing 
the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in 
the estimation process. If the moment condition holds, 
then the instrument is valid, and the model has been 
correctly specified. Second, it is important to test that 
there is no serial correlation among the transformed 
error term. Third, to test the validity of extra moment’s 
conditions on the system GMM, the difference in Hansen 
test is used. This test measures the difference between the 
Hansen statistic generated from the system GMM and the 
difference GMM. Failure to reject the three null hypotheses 
gives support to the estimated model.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
For the results to be valid, the banking sector should 
be in the long run equilibrium during the period of 
test. Following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and 
Utrero-Gonzalez (2004), this study has computed the 
dependent variable as ln(1 + ROA). Table 1 shows that 
the equilibrium in the banking sector is examined by 
estimating the equations (8). By applying the Wald 
F-test to the models, the results have rejected the null 
hypothesis of long run equilibrium at 1% significant 
level. The sum of the input price elasticities of the 
factors, are significantly different from zero for all 
specifications. The Wald test does not reject the null 
hypothesis H = 0, which indicates that Jordan and the 
GCC banking sector were in the long-run equilibrium 
over the period 2003 to 2010. 
As this study focuses on the competition level in 
Jordan and in the GCC banking sector, the empirical 
results of this study show the degree of competition 
and type of market structure based on several methods, 
e.g. static (fixed effect and dynamic GMM (difference 
and system). 
Table 2 reports the results of fixed effect model for 
the individual countries. It shows that the value of H 
statistic in Jordan is 0.67, Bahrain 0.73, Qatar 0.18, UAE 
0.29, Saudi Arabia 0.32, Kuwait 0.66, and Oman (-.34). 
The above results indicate that all the countries except 
Oman are operating under a monopolistic condition. In 
the case of Oman, the banking sector is clearly operating 
under a monopoly market since its H value is negative.
The results of this paper are consistent with 
Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) in which suggested that 
competitive condition, monopolistic competition and 
monopoly exist within the GCC economies. Their findings 
showed the existence of monopolistic competition in 
Bahrain and Qatar. The banking sectors in Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE have adopted perfect competition. This 
could be explained either by the presence of the foreign 
banks in these countries or the preparation of these three 
countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE) for entering the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the implications of 
‘threat of entry’. The banking sector in Oman generated 
its revenue under monopoly. This could be due to the 
fact that anti-monopoly legislation in Oman is poorly 
developed.
Table 3 shows the estimated revenue function for 
the total sample of Jordan and the GCC countries, using 
TABLE 1. Equilibrium test results (Depended variable-ln ROA)
One step System Two step System
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. P Value Coefficient Std. Err. P value
ln (ROA)t–1 0.635 0.202 0.00*** 0.783 0.126 0.00***
ln PF 0.120 0.084 0.15 0.085 0.085 0.31
ln PL –0.051 0.149 0.73 –0.060 0.134 0.65
ln PK –0.051 0.091 0.57 –0.028 0.079 0.71
ln ASSET 0.082 0.172 0.63 0.0614 0.169 0.71
ln EQUITY –0.113 0.105 0.27 –0.099 0.097 0.30
ln LOAN –0.149 0.134 0.26 –0.083 0.101 0.41
ln FIXED 0.087 0.138 0.52 0.028 0.074 0.70
E Statistic 0.01 0.00
Hansen test 3.16 0.67 3.16 0.67
Difference (null H = exogenous): 1.29 0.25 1.29 0.25
AR(1) –2.23 0.02*** –2.83 0.00***
AR(2) 0.39 0.69 0.49 0.62
No. of instruments 21 21
No. of groups 88 88
No. of observation 465 465
Wald chi2 132.59 0.00*** 169.28 0.00***
Market Condition Equilibrium Equilibrium
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
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both fixed and random effect in Panzar and Rosse model. 
The fixed effects test in the second column shows a H 
value of 0.40, which indicates that the market structure 
operates under monopolistic competition. Similarly, 
random effects test in column 5 shows a H value of 0.27. 
This finding describes that the market structure of Jordan 
and GCC banking system during the sample period as 
monopolistically competitive. 
The results in Table 3 are consistent with earlier 
studies, which used the Panzar and Rosse model; where 
these studies found monopolistic competition in the 
banking sector. For example, Molyneux and Forbes 
(1995) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) found improved 
competition in 1998 and between the beginning and the 
end of the 1990s. Claessens and Laeven (2004) found 
relatively strong competition during the 1990s, while 
Casu and Girardone (2006) estimated a relatively low 
level of competition with H-statistic of around 0.3. 
While the different estimates of H could be attributed 
to the variation of sample periods and sample size, the 
established view is that the Jordan and the GCC banking 
sector is one of monopolistic competition. 
As for the other explanatory variables in Table 
3, ASSET and LOAN take a positive and significant 
coefficient. As expected, bigger bank and higher share 
of loans play an important role in generating revenues. 
In contrast, the ratio of equity to total assets does 
not influence banks’ income, as its coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. 
Apart from the results of static panel, this study also 
reports the estimation results using dynamic panel for 
robustness, checking to assess the degree of competition 
in Jordan and in the GCC banking sector. Table 4 shows 
the estimated values of H based on equation (10), with 
results for the one-step estimator as well as the robust 
one-step estimator. Table 4 describes the estimates for 
total revenue as the dependent variable. From these 
columns one could observe that of the three input prices, 
the unit price of funds (PF) is significant at conventional 
levels of significance, suggesting that the cost of funds 
is an important contributor to total income. The H value 
is 0.225 and similarly the two-step difference in column 
5 shows that the H value is 0.447. These indicate that, 
the market structure in Jordan and in the GCC countries 
operate under monopolistic competition.
The results in Table 4 and 5 show that the AR (2) 
for testing the serial correlation and the Hansen test for 
testing the validity of instrument adopted are also valid. 
As shown, the p values for the AR(2) and Hansen tests 
are higher than 0.10, that is, statistically insignificant at 
the 1% significance level. These imply that the instrument 
adoption is valid because there is no serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) in the transformed residuals, and the 
instruments (moment conditions) used in the models are 
valid. The one step and two step system in Table 5 shows 
that the AR(2) for testing the serial correlation and the 
Hansen test for testing the validity of instrument adopted, 
are also valid. In the one-step system, the p value for the 
TABLE 2. Fixed Effect Model for Panzar and Rosse
Jordan Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
ln PF 0.021
(1.27)
0.114
(1.12)
0.109
(1.02)
–0.346
(–2.96)***
0.191
(2.10)**
0.043
(0.74)
0.230
(2.08)**
ln PL 0.338
(5.42)***
–0.136
(–0.58)
0.330
(1.33)
–0.770
(–4.20)***
0.169
(0.31)
0.125
(0.34)
1.484
(3.46)***
ln PK 0.319
(5.18)***
0.756
(3.23)***
0.228
(0.95)
0.676
(2.15)**
–0.176
(–0.28)
0.158
(0.56)
–1.423
(–3.57)***
ln ASSET 0.615
(–10.22)***
0.0621
(0.18)
–0.475
(–1.02)
0.465
(2.41)**
1.206
(2.00)**
–1.293
(–2.21)**
1.699
(3.52)***
ln EQUITY 0.536
(12.56)***
0.452
(2.21)**
1.070
(2.77)***
0.431
(2.01)**
0.583
(3.14)***
0.782
(3.31)***
0.459
(2.18)**
ln LOAN 0.361
(12.08)***
–0.254
(–3.60)***
0.092
(0.58)
0.159
(0.46)
–0.403
(–1.14)
0.398
(1.51)
0.174
(0.52)
ln FIXED 0.516
(9.36)***
0.708
(3.24)***
0.134
(0.54)
0.485
(1.56)
–0.506
(–0.82)
0.014
(0.04)
–1.389
(–3.50)***
H Value 0.67 0.73 0.66 –0.34 0.18 0.32 0.29
F test H = 0
P value
68.22
(0.00)***
5.93
(0.00)***
33.56
(0.00)***
30.78
(0.00)***
0.02
(0.89)
0.08
(0.77)
0.04
(0.84)
F-statistic 22.94 2.69 2.55 4.39 7.44 3.27 3.74
Adj. R2 0.97 0.47 0.69 0.89 0.79 0.11 0.68
Competitive 
Condition
Monopolistic
Competition
Monopolistic
competition
Monopolistic
competition Monopoly
Monopolistic
competition
Monopolistic
competition
Monopolistic
competition
*Significant at 10% , **Significant at 5% , ***Significant at 1%
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TABLE 3. Panzar and Rosse model for Jordan and GCC banking market
Fixed effect Random effect
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. t value Coefficient Std. Err. Z value
Intercept –2.824 0 .657 ( –4.29)*** –2.625 0 .531 ( –4.94)***
ln PF 0. 282 0.038 ( 5.96 )*** 0.265 0.046 ( 5.66 )***
ln PL 0 .285 0.065 ( 3.13 )*** 0.262 0. 057 (4.53 )***
ln PK –0.165 0.081 ( –2.13 )** –0.257 0. 072 ( –3.56 )***
ln ASSET 0 .427 0.106 ( 4.21 )*** 0.370 0. 101 ( 3.66 )***
ln EQUITY 0 .532 0.090 ( 6.27 )*** 0.640 0. 081 ( 7.85 )***
ln LOAN 0 .119 0.069 ( 2.04 )** 0. 132 0. 058 ( 2.26 )***
ln FIXED –0.140 0.076 (–1.70 )* –0. 180 0. 081 ( –2.21 )**
H Value 0.40 0.27
F test H = 0 13.37 (0.00) *** 31.15 (0.00) ***
F Statistic 87.82
Adj. R2 0.856 0.866
No. of Obs. 638 638
No. of Group 90 90
Competitive Condition Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic 
Competition
 Note: “t” and ‘z’ values are in parenthesis
*Significant at 10% , **Significant at 5% , ***Significant at 1%
TABLE 4. Panzar and Rosse Dynamic panel-data estimation, GMM 
One step Difference Two step Difference
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. P Value Coefficient Std. Err. P value
ln (Rev)t–1 0 .384 0.439 (0.38) 0.124 0.100 (0.21)
ln PF 0 .271 0 .107 (0.01)*** 0.287 0.039 (0.00)***
ln PL 0 .187 0 .195 (0.33) 0.318 0.094 (0.00)***
ln PK –0.233 0 .146 (0.11) –0.158 0.091 (0.08)*
ln ASSET 0 .409 0 .146 (0.00)*** 0 .341 0.116 (0.00)***
ln EQUITY 0 .546 0 .098 (0.00)*** 0.577 0.101 (0.00)***
ln LOAN 0 .104 0 .087 (0.23) 0.127 0.077 (0.10)
ln FIXED –0.266 0.203 (0.19) –0.174 0.088 (0.04)**
H Value 0.225 0.447
Hansen test 3.14 (0.67) 14.07 (0.29)
Difference (null H = exogenous): 6.23 (0.28) 5.93 (0.54)
AR(1) –1.41 (0.02)** –2.42 (0.01)***
AR(2) –0.36 (0.72) –0.86 (0.39)
F test H = 0 0.32 (0.57) 8.11 (0.00)***
No. of instruments 13 27
No. of groups 87 87
No. of observation 458 458
Wald chi2 791.17 (0.00)*** 1246.04 (0.00)***
Competitive Condition Monopolistic  Competition
Monopolistic 
Competition
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; 
P-values in parenthesis
H-value is the estimated Rosse-Panzar’s H-statistic
Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimates
AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd order autocorrelation for the GMM first-difference estimate residuals
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AR(2) is 0.64 and Hansen tests is 0.18 which is higher 
than 0.10, that is, statistically insignificant at the 10% 
significance level. Similarly in the two-step system, the 
results of AR(2) and Hansen test imply that the instrument 
adoption is valid because there is no serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) in the transformed residuals, and the 
instruments (moment conditions) used in the models are 
valid. Whereas the H value of 0.742 in column 2 and 
0.664 in column 5, indicate that the market structure 
of Jordan and the GCC’s banking sectors operate under 
monopolistic competition.
Overall, the consistent results in Table 2 – Table 
5 that indicate competitive conditions confirm that 
almost all the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. All the tests also confirm 
the good fit of models. The F-statistics for testing the 
hypotheses H=0 and H=1 indicate that we could reject 
the null hypotheses at 1% level of significance for all 
estimations. The estimation for the test statistic H is 
significantly positive for the overall sample. These 
results suggest that the value of the test statistic H is 
positive and statistically different from 0 and unity, 
rejecting both the monopoly and perfect competition 
hypotheses. The economic interpretation of these 
statistics is that banks in Jordan and in the GCC are 
actually operating under monopolistic competition. 
With regard to the coefficients on the bank specific 
factors for the pooled sample, the sign on the size 
coefficient (TA) is positive and significant in some cases, 
suggesting that size differentials in assets among banks 
lead to higher total revenues per dollar of assets for the 
larger banks. Another significant variable with positive 
coefficient is the loan, and it suggests that banks with 
a higher proportion of lending in their total liabilities 
are able to generate higher interest revenues. The risk 
coefficient, (EQTY), is not significant in most cases and 
has the expected negative sign, indicating that banks 
with low proportion of equity capital (riskier banks) are 
able to generate higher income per dollar of their assets. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the expectation 
that globalization and deregulation of financial markets, 
together with the adoption of new technology have 
increased the competitive conditions in Jordan and in 
the GCC banking markets. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the 
market structure and the level of banking competition in 
Jordan relative to the six GCC by using the Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) model. Two panel data approaches namely, 
TABLE 5. Panzar and Rosse Dynamic panel-data estimation, GMM 
One step System Two step System
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. P Value Coefficient Std. Err. P value
ln (Rev)t–1 0.079 0.091 (0.38) 0.084 0.091 (0.35)
ln PF 0.330 0.062 (0.00)*** 0.261 0.052 (0.00)***
ln PL 0.437 0.119 (0.00)*** 0.445 0.121 (0.00)***
ln PK –0.025 0.136 (0.85) –0.042 0.158 (0.78)
ln ASSET –0.010 0 .286 (0.97) 0.118 0.225 (0.60)
ln EQUITY 0.637 0.138 (0.00)*** 0.598 0.141 (0.00)***
ln LOAN 0.333 0.141 (0.01)*** 0.263 0.130 (0.04)**
ln FIXED 0.007 0.155 (0.05)** –0.028 0165 (0.86)
H Value 0.742 0.664
Hansen test 7.45 (0.18) 7.45 (0.18)
Difference (null H = exogenous): 5.66 (0.46) 5.66 (0.46)
AR(1) –2.74 (0.00)*** –2.52 (0.01)***
AR(2) –0.46 (0.64) –0.53 (0.59)
F test H = 0 11.59 (0.00)*** 8.37 (0.00)***
No. of instruments 26 26
No. of groups 90 90
No. of observation 548 548
Wald chi2 8069.54 (0.00)*** 9123.80 (0.00)***
Competitive Condition Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition
 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; 
 P-values in parenthesis
 H-value is the estimated Rosse-Panzar’s H-statistic
 Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimates
 AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd order autocorrelation for the GMM first-difference estimate residuals
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fixed effect and dynamic panel GMM estimators are used 
in evaluating the H-statistic for the sample period of 
2003-2010. 
The empirical results based on static panel (fixed and 
random effect) and dynamic panel GMM estimator reveal 
that all the countries are operating under monopolistic 
competition except for Oman in which its banking sector 
is operating under monopoly condition. The results also 
indicate that the estimated H-statistics for the sample 
period are positive and the Wald test for either monopoly 
or perfect competition market structure is rejected. 
Thus, the findings indicate that banks in Jordan and in 
the GCC countries generate revenue under the condition 
of monopolistic competition. Therefore, the Jordanian 
government is ready to join the GCC group as its banks 
have the ability to compete with the banking sector in 
the GCC countries.
The findings draw attention to the critical role of 
the expected union among the countries under study 
in increasing competition in the banking sector. It is 
therefore important for the authorities in Jordan and 
GCC to initiate more measures to enhance competition, 
to encourage banks to be more profitable and reduce 
non-performing loans in the union. However changes in 
the competition levels must be controlled, as high level 
competition pushes banks to accept risky clients and a 
low level does not encourage banks to improve their 
services and gain more market share. In other words, the 
findings imply that the union benefits the GCC countries 
and Jordan because they would be obliged to fulfill the 
requirements for cooperation among banks. Moreover, 
it is advisable for the decision makers and authorities 
in Oman to promote competition in the market and to 
enhance the banking sector to be as competitive as the 
other union members.
There is a need to pay greater attention to the 
market condition in the banking sector within the union 
members. This is because the soundness and stability 
of the financial sector in many ways are influenced by 
the degree of competition. Maintaining the health of the 
financial system is currently one of the key objectives 
of bank supervisors. Needless to say, the formation of a 
union between the GCC and Jordan is probably the best 
cause of action in order to achieve greater competitive 
and efficiency levels at the global arena. 
NOTA
1  Since 1990s, there are major changes in the Jordanian 
banking sector in terms of privatization of banks, adapting 
to new technology, liberalization of the interest rates and 
financial deregulation.
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